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JUDICIAL AND REGULATORY DECISIONS
VALIDITY OF MUNICIPALITY'S REGULATION OF
AIRCRAFT ALTITUDE
N All-American Airlines, Inc. et al. v. Village of Cedarhurst et al.' the
district court granted a preliminary injunction restraining enforcement
of a village ordinance regulating flight of aircraft over Cedarhurst, Long
Island, New York, on the theory that the ordinance was unconstitutional in
that it conflicted with the Civil Aeronautics Act of 19382 and regulations
issued thereunder. These regulations authorized flight of aircraft over the
Village at altitudes of less than 1000 feet when approaching, landing at,
and leaving New York International Airport (Idlewild), whereas the ordi-
nance required a minimum altitude of 1000 feet.4
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed this decision, 5
stating that the validity of the ordinance, as against the authority of the
federal government to control and regulate air commerce, was sufficiently
questionable to sustain the injunction pending the outcome of litigation
concerning its enforcement. The court, however, would not definitely declare
the ordinance invalid at that preliminary stage of the proceedings, nor
would it deny the authority of the Village under its police powers to pass
such an ordinance.6 The court indicated that the defendants (the Village,
individual officials and landowners) 7 were entitled to an immediate trial
upon the issues of fact raised by their counterclaim for an injunction based
upon nuisance and trespass theories. 8 Thus, while the opinion does not en-
tirely accept plaintiffs' constitutional argument, the court indicated that
defendants' strongest position would be an affirmative attack based upon
the theory that flight of aircraft at low altitudes constitutes a nuisance or
a trespass."
1 106 F. Supp. 52 (E.D. N.Y. 1952).
252 STAT. 977 (1938), 49 U.S.C. §401 et seq. (1951); U. S. CONST. Art. I,
§8, Cl. 3, Art. VI, §2.
s 14 CODE FED. REGS. §60.1 et seq. See infra, note 24.
4 The disputed ordinance is set out in All-American Airlines Inc. v. Village
of Cedarhurst, 201 F. 2d 273, 276 (2nd Cir. 1953).
5 201 F. 2d 273 (2nd Cir. 1953).
6 Mc K. CONSOL. LAWS c. 63 §§90 & 93 (N.Y. Village Law 1951).
7 The plaintiffs are ten airlines operating out of Idlewild, together with cer-
tain pilots representing themselves and other interested pilots, and the Port of
New York Authority, which leases the land from New York City and maintains
the airport. The Administrator of Civil Aeronautics and the Civil Aeronautics
Board were permitted to intervene as plaintiffs.
s The individual defendants on behalf of all the property owners and citizens
of the Village counterclaimed for an injunction to abate the alleged nuisance and
enjoining the plaintiff airlines from committing trespasses upon the property of
the defendants. Brief for Appellants, Appendix, pp. 52a-58a, All-American Air-
lines v. Village of Cedarhurst, 201 F. 2d 273 (2nd Cir. 1953). In All-American
Airlines v. Village of Cedarhurst, 111 F. Supp. 677 (E.D. N.Y. 1953) intervenors'
motion to dismiss the counterclaim was denied. On April 22, 1953 the plaintiffs'
motion to dismiss the counterclaim, in so far as it alleges a class action on behalf
of all property owners and citizens of the Village, was granted. These cases are
now being appealed. (This information was supplied in a letter from the Deputy
General Counsel of the U. S. Dept. of Commerce.)
9 All-American Airlines v. Village of Cedarhurst, supra, note 5 at 276. The
court stated that defendants' counterclaim for an injunction was based upon
what in essence was the principle of U. S. v. Causby, 328 U. S. 256 (1946). This
decision found that flights of aircraft over private land may be so low as to be a
direct and immediate interference with enjoyment and use of the land and as
such constitute a taking of private property for public use for which respondents
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The principle case raises questions which have plagued the courts and
legal writers ever since the commercial possibilities of aviation became a
reality.1 0 The basic conflict of interest between the large-scale commercial
airport and the adjacent property owner is graphically illustrated at the
Idlewild Airport; and there also remains the unsettled dispute between state
and national sovereignty over airspace.1 Underlying these problems is the
question of to what extent the supremacy clause of the Federal Constitution
12
should be used to defeat a Village's good faith attempt to safeguard the
-lives and property of its inhabitants.
Under the Air Commerce Act of 1926,13 the United States has "complete
and exclusive national sovereignty in the airspace" above this country.
14
Under this Act and the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938,15 any citizen of the
United States is granted "a public right of freedom of transit" in air com-
merce through the "navigable" airspace above the United States.16 ("Navi-
gable airspace" is defined as "airspace above the minimum safe altitudes
of flight prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Authority.") 17 These pro-
visions coupled with an interpretation of the Causby case' s give force to
the theory that either no state sovereignty exists in navigable airspace, or
that the Federal Government has such paramount power 19 therein as to
make state sovereignty of no practical importance.20 By state "sovereignty"
it is not meant that abstract concept of sovereignty or that self-sufficient
source from which all specific political powers are derived, but rather the
right of the state to control certain activity in the face of the generally
paramount authority of the Federal Government. In the field of air com-
merce the Federal Government's authority has been specifically exercised,
and the question remains whether a state through its police powers can now
exercise its right to control (sovereignty) in an area which by statute and
judicial interpretation is said to be susceptible to, or preempted by only
national control. The import of this theory is that, while there still remains
a dispute as to whether non-navigable airspace is subject to the concurrent
jurisdiction of the state and federal governments,21 it is clear that the
(plaintiffs) were entitled to compensation under the Fifth Amendment. The
remedy made available under this decision was monetary damages. It is doubtful
if its principle could support an injunction as indicated by the court, although
it might strengthen defendants' case for a trespass by indicating that one owns
so much of the airspace above his private land as he can occupy or use.
10 See Hugin, Airspace Rights and Liabilities, 27 NOTRE DAME LAW. 69
(1952); Hunter, The Conflicting Interests of Airport Owner and Nearby Property
Owner, 11 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 539 (1946).
1 See Dinu, State Sovereignty in the Navigable Airspace, 17 J. AIR L. 43
(1950); Cooper, State Sovereignty vs. Federal Sovereignty of Navigable Air-
space, 15 J. AIR L. 27 (1948).
12 U. S. CONST. Art. VI, §2.
13 44 STAT. 548 (1926), 49 U.S.C. §171 et seq. (1951).
1444 STAT. 572 (1926), 49 U.S.C. §176(a) (1951).
1552 STAT. 977 (1938), 49 U.S.C. §401 et seq. (1951).
16 52 STAT. 980 (1938), 49 U.S.C. §403 (1951).
17 44 STAT. 574 (1926), 49 U.S.C. §180 (1951).
18 328 U. S. 256 (1946). The court apparently divided the airspace over the
United States into two zones. In the lower zone next to the earth's surface pri-
vate ownership of the, airspace was recognized for purposes of claiming an un-
lawful interference. But in the upper zone (navigable airspace) paramount
control belonged to the Federal Government. This would be consistent with the
Congressional declaration that such airspace is "within the public domain."19 For further exposition of this theory see Cooper, op. cit. supra, note 11.
20 United States v. California, 332 U. S. 19 (1947). The Court at p. 36 cited
the Causby case in support of their finding that when national rights are in-
volved the Federal Government occupies a paramount position as against state.
sovereignty. It would follow, that if, as seems apparent from the citation of the
Causby case in the California opinion, "navigable airspace" involves considera-
tions of national rights, then the Federal Government is dominant in that region.
21 See note 29, infra.
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Federal Government has an exclusive right to control in that airspace de-
nominated by Congress as "navigable. '2 2 If this "zone" theory of the
Causby case carries legal weight, it would appear that notwithstanding its
police powers, the state, or a subdivision (such as the defendant Village),
would be precluded from exercising any control whatever over the flight of
aircraft within navigable airspace over its boundaries. As might be ex-
pected, the state courts express a different view, one court concluding that
the right of the state to control is based on the practical necessity of self-
protection.2 3
The dispute over the state's right to regulate "navigable" airspace, while
it may be important in other similar cases, need not be troublesome in the
Cedarhurst case. Since the minimum safe altitudes of flight over this con-
gested area is designated as 1000 feet, 24 it can be argued that the exceptions,
and other regulations for turning, approaching, maneuvering, etc., 25 do not
prescribe, as was noted in the Causby case, 26 minimum safe altitudes of
flight (above which is navigable airspace), but govern merely the conduct
of take-off and landing operations. If so, the constitutional issue is not
"sovereignty," but whether, as a matter of fact, enforcement of the Village
ordinance would necessarily result in a conflict with federal regulations or
in an intrusion into a field dominated by federal control. Therefore, before
there is a determination on the constitutionality of the ordinance, the effect
of this ordinance upon any compliance by plaintiffs with the federal regula-
tions should be established as a fact. Consideration should be given to the
following questions: 1) To what extent would enforcement of the ordinance
result in conflict with the regulations? 2) Are the regulations mandatory
in the sense that they demand that aircraft fly at lower altitudes, or are
they only permissive in that they would sanction flight at lower altitudes
when necessary for landing or taking-off? (In this connection inquiry into
technical flight and runway difficulties would be proper, for if it could be
established that before approaching Cedarhurst, flight above 1000 feet is
attainable with safety, then compliance with the ordinance would not neces-
sarily invite a conflict with the federal regulations.)
Under the above analysis and assuming that the regulations are man-
datory, plaintiffs would prevail only if they are able to demonstrate factually
that they will violate the federal law27 by obeying the state law, or vice
versa.28 However, when actual conflict between federal and state law is
shown the federal law is supreme. 29
22 See note 17, supra.
23 Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., 270 Mass. 511, 170 N.E. 385, 389
(1930) ; cf. Erickson v. King, 218 Minn. 98, 15 N.W. 2d 201 (1944) ; cf. Parker v.
Granger 4 Cal. 2d 668, 52 P. 2d 226 (1935).
24 14 CODE FED. REGS. §60.17 provides that except when necessary for land-
ing and taking-off, the minimum safe altitude of flight over congested areas is
1000 feet.
21 14 CODE FED. REGS. §600.1 et seq.; 14 CODE FED. REGS. §601.1 et seq.; 14
CODE FED. REGS. §§601.1981, 601.2238. These regulations established civil air-
ways, control areas and control zones. See also Technical Standard Order of the
Administrator TSO-N 18, April 26, 1950 in which the Administrator has estab-
lished airport criteria for clearance areas for 1) approaching, 2) maneuvering,
3) turning, 4) landing and 5) taking-off from Idlewild: (many of these pass over
Cedarhurst at altitudes of less than 1000 feet).
26 328 U. S. 256 at 263 (1946).
27 52 STAT. 1015 (1938), 49 U.S.C. §621 (1951).
28 Southern Ry. Co. v. Reid, 222 U. S. 424, 442 (1912).
29 The case of Bethlehem Co. v. State Board, 330 U. S. 767 (1947), cited by
the Court of Appeals in the principal case in support of national supremacy,
would give the supremacy and commerce clauses broader interpretations in that
conflict would not be a necessary prerequisite for unconstitutionality if the state
attempted to legislate in a field in which Congress had asserted general jurisdic-
tion. ef. Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line 272 U. S. 605 (1926) ; Cooley v. Wardens
of the Port of Phila., 12 How. 299 (1851). Thus, the factual determination de-
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The individual defendants, anticipating that the ordinance might be
declared invalid, have sought security for their lives and property in their
counterclaim 3o which is, in essence, based upon tort principles of nuisance
and trespass as applied to the field of aviation law.31 The objective of the
counterclaim is to enjoin flight from a particularly objectionable runway.
The doctrines of trespass and nuisance therein relied upon involve distinct
legal theories. In nuisance actual damage to an interest of the complainant
must be shown. 32 In trespass it is necessary to show that a possessory inter-
est in property has been invaded. The airspace into which the aircraft
intrudes must be airspace in which the surface landowner retains a property
interest. Actually, the interest is often intangible, and most legal theories33
have been inadequate because the conflict of interests between the airport
and aircraft operator on the one hand, and the adjoining landowner on the
other, is so dependent on variable facts that it permits no solution by a fixed
legal formula. 34
The courts have been reluctant to completely deny rights in airspace to
the surface owner. Thus, while the maxim "he who owns the soil owns it to
the heavens" has been specifically rejected,35 a fairly workable rule has been
evolved by which right to the exclusive possession of airspace extends up-
wards only to that point necessary for the full use and enjoyment of the
land, the balance being regarded as open (and navigable) airspace. 36 Under
this theory the landowner would have a dominant right of occupancy for
purposes incident to the use and enjoyment of the surface, and an unreason-
able interference with his actual occupancy of the land would be actionable.
More recently, the courts have been prone to grant relief against an un-
reasonable interference with the complete enjoyment of land on a nuisance
rather than a trespass theory.37 This trend seems justifiable because it is
practical; that is, the courts want proof of actual damage and interference
with one's use and enjoyment of the land, and not merely a showing that an
aircraft in low flight invaded a landowner's alleged airspace rights.
In defendants' counterclaim there are specific allegations which raise
certain factual issues relating to nuisance. 38 Whether their case is strong
scribed in the text might well be avoided if the court could be persuaded that the
ordinance, as an attempt at local regulation of air traffic, was an intrusion in a
field of air commerce preempted by exhaustive and complete regulation by the
Federal Government. See the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson in
Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 332 U. S. 292 (1944), on the question whether
it was the intent of Congress to exclusively occupy the field of air traffic regu-
lation.
30 See note 8, supra.
31 See German, The Conflicting Interests of Airport Owners and Near-by
Property Owners, 20 KAN. CITY L. REV. 138 (1952).
32 Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514, 173 S.E. 817 (1934) ; Swetland
v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 55 F. 2d 201 (6th Cir. 1931).
33 RHYNE, AIRPORTS AND THE COURTS 154-162 (1944); Rhyne, Airport Legis-
lation and Court Decisions, 14 J. AIR L. 289 (1947).
34 Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 55 F. 2d 201 (6th Cir. 1931); Bell &
Pogue, The Legal Framework of Airport Operations, 14 J. AIR L. 253 (1952).
35 United States v. Causby, 328 U. S. 256 (1946); See also Sweeney, Adjust-
ing to the Conflicting Interests of Landowner and Aviator in Anglo-American
Law, 3 J. AIR L. 329, 531 (1932).
36 United States v. Causby, supra; Northwest Airlines v. Minn., 322 U. S. 292
(Concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson); Swetland v. Curtiss Airports
Corp., 55 F. 2d 201 (6th Cir. 1931).
37 Anderson v. Souza, 38 Cal. 2d 825, 243 P. 2d 497 (1952) ; Barrier v. Trout-
man, 231 N.C. 47, 55 S.E. 2d 923 (1949); Delta Air Corp. v. Kersey, 193 Ga. 862,
20 S.E. 2d 245 (1942) ; Swetland v. Curtiss Airport Corp., 55 F. 2d 201 (6th
Cir. 1931).
38 There are allegations that the acts of plaintiffs cause great annoyance
and vibration and deprive defendants of the quiet use and peaceful enjoyment
of their property. Further, that aircraft flights at altitudes from 162 feet to
1000 feet render the homes of defendants unfit for peaceful habitation, interrupt
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enough to warrant injunctive relief is doubtful. An airport is not a nuisance
per se, but it may become such from the manner of its construction or opera-
tion, or because of its unsuitable location.8 9 Airports have been held to be
nuisances because of dust, noise, lights, congregation of crowds, or justified
apprehension of damages. 40 But whether or not a nuisance has been created
depends upon the particular facts of each case. Therefore defendants' prob-
lem is twofold: first, they must prove facts which constitute a nuisance, and
second, they must convince the court that injunctive relief is justified.
Defendants' counterclaim raises the question whether the individual
defendants will be precluded from showing a nuisance or trespass upon proof
by the plaintiffs that the manner in which their aircraft are operated sub-
stantially complies with the federal regulations authorizing flight of air-
craft at altitudes of less than 1000 feet. The Swetland41 case has indicated
that the federal regulations prescribing altitudes for flight of aircraft do
not determine the rights of a surface owner either as to trespass or nui-
sance. That is, these regulations are not to be construed as authoring flight
of aircraft at such low altitudes as to interfere with the reasonable use and
enjoyment of land.4 2 On the factual issue this is a point in defendants'
favor.
Assuming that case law would permit a finding of nuisance or continuing
trespass, the defendants face their greatest obstacle in the judiciary's grow-
ing reluctance to afford injunctive relief which would effectively stifle the
operation of a large airport greatly affected with the public interests. 43
The controlling factor is the adjusting of two public interests: 1) the inter-
est of society and the individual land owner in preventing interferences with
use and enjoyment of private property; and 2) the public interest in foster-
ing and preserving growth and safety in commercial aviation. Where the
inconveniences and hardships to the latter caused by injunctive relief out-
weigh the benefits to the former, such relief should not be granted.44 In
the rest and sleep of the residents, adversely affecting their health, depreciating
the value of their buildings and property, and creating in this and other ways a
nuisance to the damage of defendants. Brief for Appellants, Appendix pp 52a-
58a, All-American Airlines v. Village of Cedarhurst, 201 F. 2d 273 (2nd Cir.
1953).
39 Crew v. Gallagher, 358 Pa. 541, 58 A. 2d 179 (1948) ; Oechsle v. Ruhl, 140
N.J. Eq. 355, 54 A. 2d 462 (1947); Delta Air Corp. v. Kersey, 193 Ga. 862, 20
S.E. 2d 245 (1942) ; Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 55 F. 2d 201 (6th Cir.
1932).
40 Depreciation of property has been held not to be grounds for nuisance.
See Vanderslice v. Shawn, 26 Del. Ch. 225, 27 A. 2d 87 (1942).
41 55 F. 2d 201 at 203 (1931) ; of. Anderson v. Souza, 38 Cal. 2d 825, 243 P.
2d 497 (1952).
42 See United States v. Causby, supra, note 9 where a federal regulation
approving a glide angle did not prevent the ultimate holding against the Govern-
ment.
43 But see the case of Antonik v. Chamberlain, 81 Ohio app. 465, 78 N.E. 2d
752, 758 (1947), in which it was held that federal regulations which determine
minimum safe altitudes of flight also contain exceptions which grant a license to
fly at lower altitudes above private land when landing or taking-off. However,
this license is revoked when abused and such abuse exists upon a showing of
nuisance or upon proof of an appropriation of the owner's property without just
compensation. Antonik v. Chamberlain, supra. By appropriation it is meant
a taking such as the kind seen in United States v. Causby, 328 U. S. 256 (1946);
cf. Portsmouth Harbor Land and Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U. S. 327 (1922).
44 Kuntz v. Werner Flying Service, 257 Wis. 405, 43 N.W. 2d 476 (1950);
Antonik v. Chamberlain, 81 Ohio app. 465, 78 N.E. 2d 752 (1947). Idlewild's
great size is attested to by the findings of the trial judge. All-American Air-
lines v. Village of Cedarhurst, 106 F. Supp. 521 (E.D. N.Y. 1952). Its cargo
shipments are comparatively large, while its property investment is upwards of
one hundred million dollars, and its gross operating revenues in excess of three
million dollars. The airport serves more than 300 flights per day transporting
some 2,500,000 passengers per year, 800,000 for overseas passage.
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none of the cases in which injunctions were granted for nuisance or trespass
were the courts dealing with an airport of Idlewild's magnitude, and in one
of the cases in which some measure of relief was granted, the Kersey case,
the court, in upholding a petition for injunction against a demurrer, indi-
cated that "if on trial it should appear that it is indispensable to the public
interest that the airport should continue to be operated in its present con-
dition, it may be that petitioner should be denied injunctive relief.45
CONCLUSION
The ultimate disposition of the Cedarhurst case may be expected to indi-
cate that conflicts between the large airport and the adjoining landowner
are not to be resolved by the methods which defendants tried. State or
municipal prohibitory action runs the risk of burdening interstate commerce,
conflicting with federal statutes or regulations, or interfering in a field pre-
empted by national control. Resort to a prayer for injunctive relief by the
landowner upon grounds of nuisance or trespass will usually prove futile
with respect to the large airport because of the public and governmental
interest in its continued operation.
These conclusions do not mean that those in the individual defendants'
position should be entirely remediless. While the growth of modern aviation
must necessarily be favored, this growth should not be permitted to inter-
fere with private property rights without paying its way.46 Aside from ex
parte relief in the form of land purchases by the industry, defendants may
have a remedy through an assessment of permanent damages under a per-
manent nuisance doctrine. Depreciation in the value of defendants' property
would be one basis upon which the jury could assess permanent damages.
It is true that defendants here do not seek monetary relief,47 but such relief
should ease their plight.
EXECUTIVE PROHIBITION AGAINST FLIGHT OVER NATIONAL
FOREST - A TAKING OF PRIVATE PROPERTY UNDER
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
N December, 1949, the President issued an Executive Order' creating in
airspace reservation in those areas in Northern Minnesota within the
boundaries of the Superior National Forest which had previously been
designated by the Secretary of Agriculture as "roadless areas." After
January 1, 1951, all aircraft were prohibited in these areas below an altitude
of 4,000 feet except for emergency landings, low level flight for safety pur-
poses, official business, or for the conduct of rescue operations. Persons who
had customarily flown to and from private lands were permitted, subject to
the regulations of the Secretary of Agriculture, to operate aircraft within
these areas until January 1, 1952. Violators of these provisions were to be
subject to penalties prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938.2 After
the effective date of this order, four persons repeatedly violated its provisions.
Three of these, Messrs. Perko, Skala, and Zupancich, were owners of resort
45 Kuntz v. Werner Flying Service, supra note 46; Delta Air Corp. v. Ker-
sey, 193 Ga. 862, 20 S.E. 2d 245 (1942).
46 Delta Air Corp. v. Kersey, supra note 47. In Kuntz v. Werner Flying
Service, supra note 47, the court pointed out that money damages would be ade-
quate relief. This would be consistent with the trend away from injunctions.
47 United States v. Causby, supra note 9.
1 Executive Order No. 10092, 14 FED. REG. 7637 (1949).
252 STAT. 973 (1938), 49 U.S.C. §401 (1946).
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properties located entirely within the boundaries of the designated areas,
having obtained their title from land patents of the United States. They
maintained summer residences there to operate these resorts, and in this
way they earned their livelihood. Air transport afforded the only practical
means of access to these properties, other than canoe or boat in the summer
and on foot or snowshoes in the winter.8 The fourth violator, a Mr. West,
operated a commercial aviation service from Ely, Minnesota, and served the
resorts of the other three. In March, 1952, the United States brought suit
in the District Court for the District of Minnesota to enjoin these people
from continuing to violate the executive order in any way. A permanent in-
junction was issued,4 the court of appeals affirmed this decision,5 and the
Supreme Court denied certiorari.6
One of the issues raised by the defense was whether this executive order
had a statutory basis. The Air Commerce Act of 19267 provides that the
President may set aside airspace reservations for "national defense or other
governmental purposes. . . ." Since there was clearly no national defense
basis for this order, the specific problem presented by the Perko case is what
was the "other governmental purpose(s)" toward which the Executive
Order was directed?8 The district court said that the construction of the
phrase "other governmental purposes" in this provision of the Air Com-
merce Act is one of first impression in the Perko case. 9
The creation of National Forests is authorized by the Forest Reserve
Act of 189710 for the express purposes of improving and protecting the
forests, securing favorable conditions for water flowage, and furnishing
timber for the use of citizens of the United States." Since the passage of
this act and the creation of the Superior National Forest, 12 there have been
significant extensions of the original National Forest policy in the Lake
Superior region. The Shipstead-Nolan Act of 193013 withdrew certain
lands within that region from all forms of entry and appropriation under
the public land laws. The express purpose of this Act was conservation of
the natural beauty of the shore lines for recreational use.14 Further expan-
8108 F. Supp. 315, 316 (D. Minn. 1952).
4 United States v. Perko, 108 F. Supp. 315 (D. Minn. 1952).
5 Perko v. United States, 204 F. 2d 446 (8th Cir. 1953).
6 74 S. Ct. 48 (1953). Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas were of the
opinion that certiorari should have been granted.
7 44 STAT. 570 (1926), 49 U.S.C. §174 (1946).
8 The defendants urged, in the district court and the court of appeals, that
"other governmental purposes" is to be construed to mean other governmental
purposes akin to national defense. They pointed out that the only airspace
reservations so far created have been those in areas where atomic energy projects
are located. Both courts rejected this contention on the basis of the meager
legislative history. They cited a Senate debate involving a conference report on
the Air Commerce Act, in which Senator Bingham stated that the President is
authorized, by the terms of that Act, to set apart airspace reservations for
military, postal, and other purposes. 67 CONG. REC. 9355 (1926).
Old. at 322.
1030 STAT. 34 (1897), 16 U.S.C. §475 (1946).
11 See 23 Ops. ATT'Y. GEN. 589 (1901), indicating that these purposes are to be
construed narrowly. The Attorney General indicated that the creation of a game
reservation in a national forest was not to be implied to be within the stated
purposes.
12 The Superior National Forest was created by Presidential Proclamation
in 1909. 35 STAT. 2223 (1909).
13 46 STAT. 1020 (1930), 16 U.S.C. §577 (1946).
14 An indication of Congressional concern with preserving the primitive
condition of the area is to be found in the House Committee Report, H.R. REP.
No. 1945, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. (1930). The defendants, in their briefs, indicated
that the basic purpose of the Shipstead-Nolan Act was to prevent private power
interests from building a dam.
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sion of this policy took place in 1948 with the passage of the Thye-Blatnik
Act.15 This Act authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to acquire any lands
within the Superior area where, in his opinion, exploitation or potentialities
for exploitation threatened to impair the natural features of the "remain-
ing wilderness canoe country."'16 In this way Congress intended to discour-
age commercial development of the area,17 and on this basis there is support
for the district court's finding that there is a federal policy of preserving
the Superior region in its wilderness state. The creation of "planeless
areas" is well calculated to preserve the wilderness character of this plot,'8
and therefore the Executive Order is directed to a valid "governmental
purpose."
There is, however, a fundamental problem created by this conclusion.
The reason for the air ban is that it tends to carry out the policy of discour-
aging commercial development in the area by preventing the use of aircraft
to bring in building materials and supplies. 19 But, since air travel is the
only practical means of access, the effect of the air ban is to deprive private
property owners of ingress and egress to their property. Does the govern-
mental purpose in maintaining the wilderness area extend to maintaining
an area which is privately owned in an inaccessible state of nature? Or,
ultimately, does the exclusive national sovereignty in navigable airspace
recognized by the Air Commerce Act of 192620 entitle the Federal Govern-
ment to deprive a surface landowner of the only practical means of access to
his property?
It seems at least doubtful that Congress intended to create an inaccessi-
ble recreational area. The very legislation that established national forests,
the Forest Reserve Act of 1897,21 expressly provided that nothing therein
should "be construed as prohibiting the egress or ingress of actual settlers
residing within the boundaries of national forests .... '22 The district court
stated that this provision does not aid the defendants, since nothing in the
air ban prohibits utilization of defendants' property. This condition is con-
trary to its own finding that the effect of the air ban was, for all practical
purposes, to make the Superior area inaccessible. In subsequent legislation
there are further, indications that Congress did not intend these statutes
to be used to deprive private property owners of access to their property.
During debate on the Shipstead-Nolan Act, Senator Nolan stated that the
bill was not intended to restrict the use or occupancy of private lands,
whether for agriculture, mining or other development. 23 The Department
of Agriculture, in its regulations, expressly provides that roads are to be
allowed in the roadless areas if necessary for ingress to and egress from
1562 STAT. 568 (1948), 16 U.S.C. §577(c) (Supp. 1949).
16 Ibid.
17 H.R. REP. No. 2186, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948). There was no specific
provision in this Act for acquisition of properties like those of Perko, Skala, and
Zupancich when those resorts were built; they all were purchased before 1948.
But the policy of no commercial development had been in existence since 1939,
when the Forest Service of the Department of Agriculture issued a regulation
setting forth that policy, 3 CODE FED. REGS. §251.20 (1939), under authority
granted to the Secretary of Agriculture to regulate "occupancy and use" of
national forests by the Forest Reserve Act of 1897, 30 STAT. 35 (1897), 16 U.S.C.
§551 (1946).
18 The argument that 23 Ops. ATT'Y. GEN. 589 (1901) discourages regula-
tion of national forests for purposes other than to conserve timber and water
resources seems to have spent its force, since the history of national forest legis-
lation has indicated that maintenance of recreational areas is clearly consistent
with the maintenance of national forest reserves.
19 See H.R. REP. No. 2196, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948).2044 STAT. 572 (1926), 49 U.S.C. §176 (1946).
21 See note 10 supra.
2230 STAT. 36 (1897), 16 U.S.C. §478 (1946).
28 72 CONG. REC. 12464 (1930).
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private property.24 In fact, by 1948, the Department was convinced that
the only way it could prevent the exercise of private property rights in a
manner inconsistent with maintaining the area as a wilderness was to ac-
quire such property.2 5 Congress, in passing the Thye-Blatnik Act,26 appar-
ently adopted this position of the Department of Agriculture, since the Act
seems to require that if there is a use of private property inconsistent with
the wilderness policy, the Department must take steps to acquire such
property. 27 Thus, Congress apparently intended to protect private property
owners while furthering its national forest policy.
As a result of the Executive Order and the district court's injunction,
three individuals have been practically excluded from enjoyment of their
property. Is any relief available to them? The Fifth Amendment provides
that "No person . . . shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law, nor shall private property be taken for a public use
without just compensation.12 8 Does a denial of ingress to and egress from
property constitute a compensable "taking" under this language of the
Fifth Amendment?29
Some courts analyze injury to ingress and egress by considering them
as an independent property right with an existence and value apart from
the aggregate of rights, duties, and privileges which constitute the concept
Of property ownership. These courts speak of an easement of ingress and
egress.30 It is submitted that the problem of the Perko case is that of re-
solving the conflict of interest between the enjoyment of private property,
and a governmental policy requiring interference with that enjoyment.
Such a problem is best approached without resort to a property concept of
ingress and egress. The basic issue to be resolved is whether the extent of
government interference here has exceeded the limitations of the Fifth
Amendment, and it is submitted that such an inquiry must be framed in
terms of defining a "taking," since it is clear that Perko's interest is "prop-
erty" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Insofar as it is at all
helpful to apply the law of easements to an injury to ingress and egress, it
appears that no court has recognized an easement of ingress and egress by
air.3 1
The problem of what constitutes a taking under the Fifth Amendment
remains unsettled.3 2 The trend seems to be to extend the liability of the
24 36 CODE FED. REGS. §251.20(a) (1939).
25 Department of Agriculture report in support of the Thye-Blatnik Act:
U. S. CODE CONG. SERV., 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 1948 (1948).
26 See note 15 supra.
27 See Merced Dredging Co. v. Merced County, 67 F. Supp. 598 (N.D. Cal.
1946), which indicates that the only feasible method of preserving scenic features
of privately owned land is the use of the power of eminent domain. The district
court held that an ordinance which sought to preserve scenic values by forbidding
a mining company to carry on its operation violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
The ordinance was described as a means without substantial relation to the end
sought to be attained. See also H.R. REP. No. 2186, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948)
and U. S. CODE CONG. SERV., 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 1948 (1948). The latter report
states the position of the Department of Agriculture.
28 U. S. CONST. AMEND. V.
29 The question of recovery for injury to property rights has not yet been
litigated in the Perko case. Since both the district court and court of appeals
proceeding were in equity, both courts declined to pass on the issue.
30 See, e.g., United States v. Welch, 17 U. S. 333 (1910); Bacich v. Board
of Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 144 P. 2d 188 (1943); Burnquist v. Cook, 220 Minn.
48, 19 N.W. 2d 394 (1945). Tiffany recognizes such an easement, but it is not an
easement in the usual property sense, and he indicates that the designation of
such an easement is of limited application. TIFFANY LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
§§792-794 (3d. ed. 1939).
31 The Illinois Supreme Court, apparently the only court yet faced with such
a problem, rejected the recognition of such an easement. Rockford Electric Co.
v. Browman, 339 Ill. 212, 171 N.E. 189 (1930).
32 See Note, 4 VANDERBILT L. R. 673 (1951).
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United States to keep pace with its expanding activities 3- tempered by
the consideration that too great an extension of the taking concept may
unnecessarily restrict the United States in its public works ventures.
84
Some confusion arises from the use of "taking" to mean, on the one hand,
an actual physical taking, and on the other an interference with the legal
relationships which constitute property ownership.3 5 Originally, it was held
that actual physical invasion of property was necessary to constitute a
taking.3 6 But with the growing appreciation that property consists not only
in tangibles, but in an aggregate of legal rights, that rigid interpretation
of taking gave way to a broader one that interferences with that aggregate
of legal rights connected with ownership of property constitutes a taking.
3 7
Cormack, in his article Legal Concepts in Cases of Eminent Domain,
38
argues very forcefully that it is neither necessary nor desirable to retain
technical property considerations in the law of eminent domain. His ap-
proach, which goes to the fundamental nature of the eminent domain con-
cept, is that considerations of social policy should control, bearing in mind
that government cannot compensate the individual for every injury to his
property. The problem can best be approached by balancing the burden
placed on the individual against the benefit which will accrue to the public.
This approach does not supply a legal rule, but requires a determination of
each case on its particular facts.
3 9
There are, however, some general principles in the case law which act as
guideposts. It is well settled, for example, tlat governmental acts - short
of acquisition of title or actual occupancy - which have the effect of destroy-
ing or interrupting the lawful use of property, are takings if the effects are
so complete as to deprive the owner of all beneficial interest in his property.
40
There is some tendency to state this principle even more broadly, that is,
to classify some mere restrictions on use and enjoyment as takings. 4 1 The
33 Ibid.
34 Note, 95 U. PENN L. R. n.7 (1946).
35 For an excellent analysis of this conflict in definition, see Cormack, Legal
Concepts in Cases of Eminent Domain, 41 YALE LAW J. 222 (1931).
36 Ibid.; see also Note 95 U. PENN. L. R. n.7 (1946).
37 It is not within the scope of this discussion to trace the historical develop-
ment of the taking concept, but it is necessary to indicate the historical problems
in definition of the concept to appreciate the unsettled state of the law. The
analysis in Cormack, supra note 35, traces this development in detail up to 1924.
For purposes of this analysis, the highlights of the development can be
discerned by a reading of cases involving flooding of property by governmental
acts. It was in such a case, Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. 166 (1871),
that the physical conception of taking was first abandoned. That case stated for
the first time that actions short of absolute conversion of real property could
be held to be takings. But complete abandonment of the physical conception
was slow to develop. The cases continued to require a showing of permanent
flooding. United States v. Lynah, 188 U. S. 445 (1903). Not until United States
v. Cress, 243 U. S. 316 (1917), was a partial flooding held to be a taking, on the
theory that it is the character of the invasion, not the amount of damage that
determines a taking. But the cases still required a physical invasion to some
extent. In fact, shortly after the Cress decision, the requirement of actual per-
manent invasion was reinstated. Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U. S. 146
(1924). Not until 1950 was it held that the destruction of agricultural value
without an actual overflowing could be a taking. United States v. Kansas City
Life Insurance Co., 339 U. S. 799 (1950).
38 Cormack, note 35 supra.
39 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393 (1922); United States v.
Pewee Coal Co., 341 U. S. 114, 117 (1951); California v. Marin Water District,
17 Cal. 2d 699, 111 P. 2d 651 (1941).
40 United States v. General Motors, 323 U. S. 373 (1945); In re Sansom
Street, 293 Penn. 843, 143 Atl. 134 (1928) ; 1 NICHOLs, LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN
§107 (2d ed. 1917).
41 Miller v. Beaver Falls, 368 Penn. 189, 82 A. 2d 34 (1951); 1 NIcHOLS,
LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN §101 (2d ed. 1917).
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"use and enjoyment" principle can be carried quite far to protect the rights
of private property owners against unreasonable encroachments of sovereign
power; the government need not receive any benefit from its interference
with property rights, since the damage to the owner by itself determines
the existence of a taking.42
Two outstanding applications of the "use and enjoyment" principle are
to be found in Portsmouth Harbor Company v. United States43 and United
States v. Causby.44 In the Portsmouth case, the United States installed a
shore battery and discharged its guns over the plaintiff's summer resort.
Plaintiff sued the United States, claiming that the effect of the firing was
to frighten people off the premises, thus depriving him of the use of his
property as a resort. The Supreme Court held that there was a taking 45
and directed that the owner be compensated for the loss he suffered. In the
Causby case, low flying army planes caused noise and glare, interfering with
the use of Causby's farm for chicken raising, and disturbing the sleep and
mental well-being of the Causby family. The Court declared that this action
constituted a taking,46 marking a most significant extension of the "use
and enjoyment" principle. 47 In addition, some courts have specifically held
that permanent injury to, or destruction of, rights of ingress and egress
are takings of private property for public use.48
The fairest solution to the problem of the Perko case would have been
government acquisition of the property of Perko, Skala, and Zupancich. But
this could not be done, since the Thye-Blatnik Act prohibits acquisition of
tracts of less than 500 acres which have permanent structures, if the owner
files written objections. 49 These properties are less than 500 acres each, and
the owners would certainly have filed written objections. However, by choos-
ing to secure the issuance of the Executive Order rather than instituting
condemnation proceedings, the Department of Agriculture cannot escape
the Congressional purpose to protect private property owners. Although the
validity of the Executive Order is not open to attack, the owners have an-
other remedy by which to effectuate the Congressional purpose. Applying
the principle of the destruction of ingress and egress, and applying the "usa
and enjoyment" principle as extended in the Causby case, there appears to
be a taking of property belonging to the defendants in the principal case,
and they should be compensated for their loss. 50
42 United States v. Miller, 317 U. S. 369'(1942) ; Miller v. Beaver Falls, 368
Penn. 189, 82 A. 2d 34 (1951).
43 260 U. S. 327 (1922).
44 328 U. S. 256 (1946).
45 The court actually based the taking on a theory of implied contract, de-
rived from the intentional acts of the United States. The Perko case is stronger
in that respect. The air ban was specifically directed at certain persons, or at
least a certain class of persons. That is not true of the action in the Portsmouth
case.46 Mr. Justice Black dissented on this point.
47 See 328 U. S. 256, 261 (1946) (Opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas).
-48 Central Trust Co. v. Hennen, 90 Fed. 593 (6th Cir. 1898); Bacich v. Board
of Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 144 P. 2d 188 (1943); Liddick v. Council Bluffs, 232
Iowa 197, 5 N.W. 2d 361 (1942). The most frequent expressions of this principle
are cases involving state, county or municipal improvements which destroy the
use of streets affording access to property, or the effect of which are to place
the property owner in a cul-de-sac. An extensive citation of such cases is un-
necessary, since the principle is well established. See Note 15 L.R.A. (N.S.) 49(1908); 96 A.L.R. 639 (1934).
49 See note 15 supra.50 "We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve
the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter
cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change." Mr. Justice Holmes
in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393, 416 (1922).
